Failure Report

1. Introduction

This memo is a failure report on the Ford Pinto design flaw. Ford accelerated designs on the Ford Pinto to achieve “a large market share” which resulted in a faulty design of the fuel system (Leggett, 1999). The easily ruptured fuel system would cause explosions in rear-end collisions; although this was a known fact by Ford engineers, financial benefits influenced “top Ford officials” to continue with production (Hoffman, 1982). Due to unethical decisions made by Ford leaders, the Pinto design lacked many safety features as the cost of paying for fatalities were less than implementing the new design (Baura & Ebrary, 2006) The upcoming sections will interpret the decisions that caused the failure, reasons for the failure and future lessons to be learned.

2. Description

In May, 1968 Lee Iacocca, the Ford Motor Company vice-president introduced the design of the Ford Pinto, a subcompact car which was largely popular, but the flawed in design. Prior to the distribution of this design, a flaw in the fuel tank was noticed as subsequent cases of fuel tank explosions were brought into question (Leggett, 1999). Figure1 below provides the image of a crash test done with a Chevrolet Impala rear-ending the Ford Pinto which led to an immediate combustion of the gas tank (Gibson, 2011). In order to enhance the trunk space, the fuel tank was placed behind the rear axle with only “nine inches of separation”. This danger was further emphasized due to the position of bolts near the gas tank and the “fuel filler pipe design” which provided an increased possibility of the disconnection of the tank in the event of an accident, causing fuel tank explosions (Leggett, 1999). In 1978, two major law suits were filed against. The first one resulted in $6.6 million to be awarded to a Pinto burn victim while the second one involved three teenage girls that died after being rear-ended by a van in relatively low speed collision as proposed by a witness. This was not only a burden to Ford’s financial costs, but also a testimony on their indifference when dealing with consumer safety (Baura & Ebrary, 2006). On The Ford Motor Company was charged with many cases of homicide subsequent to this due to Ford executives’ decision which allowed an unsafe car be sold to consumers (Evan & Manison, 2002).

Figure1: Pinto Fuel System Explosion. A 1971 Chevrolet Impala rear-ending a 1972 Ford Pinto in a crash test. (Gibson, 2011)

3. Reasons for the Failure

In hindsight, we notice that the main flaw was found in the initial design of the Ford Pinto and the dangerous placement of the fuel tank in close proximity to the rear axel (Evan & Manison, 2002), but even though a new design was proposed, the officials refused to implement as the cost for implementation of Standard 301 fuel tanks would have been $137 million as opposed to $49.5 million paid to victims of collision fatalities. The fuel tank upgrades following regulations of the Standard 301, would have cost $11 per car and according and to the “risk/benefit analysis” in this situation, the Ford executives decided that the paying for the 180 burn fatalities was more cost efficient than implementing the new design. As a result the new design was not implemented until 8 years prior to the law suits (Baura & Ebrary, 2006).

4. Lessons to be Learned

Through the flaws of the Ford Pinto design, stricter safety regulations were further implemented in future designs. Also the “risk/benefit analysis” should not be used for safety decisions as it does not account for all costs of accidents due to many unclaimed lawsuits as well as the time and money spent on arguing lawsuits. Furthermore, engineering ethics were brought into perspective as even though safety costs may seem to be more proficient than benefits received, financial benefit decisions should not cloud our moral judgments.

5. References

Baura, G. D., & Ebrary, I. (2006). Engineering ethics: An industrial perspective. Boston: Academic Press.

Evan, W. M., & Manison, M. (2002). Technological catastrophes: their causes and prevention. Technology in Society, 24, 207-224.          http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X02000052

Gibson, John. (2011). Legendary Crash Test Video: 71 Impala vs 72 Pinto – Full Rear        Impact. Chevy Hardcore. Retrieved from            http://www.chevyhardcore.com/news/legendary-crash-test-video-71-impala-         vs-72-pinto-full-rear-impact/

Hoffman, W. Michael. (1982). Corporate Obligations and Responsibilities: Everything Old             Is New Again. Case Study The Ford Pinto, 222-229. http://businessethics.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2012/01/HoffmanPinto.pdf

Leggett, Christopher. (1999). The Ford Pinto Case: The Valuation of Life as It Applies to   the Negligence-Efficiency Argument. Retrieved from       http://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/1999/Leggett-       pinto.html